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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Minority candidates on party lists: evidence from Belgium

Yuksel Alper Ecevit[1] · **Barbara Sgouraki Kinsey**[2]

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Abstract

Nomination of candidates of non-Western origin on party lists is a major step toward immigrant-origin minorities' political representation, however its determinants are understudied. This paper focuses on such nominations by parties on the Left, Social Democratic and Green. We extend theory on the electoral risks of nominating immigrant-origin minority candidates to study systematically how *cultural citizenship* conditions the effects of political and economic factors on number of nominations. Belgium provides excellent testing grounds due to regional variation in cultural citizenship between Flanders and Wallonia, while electoral and citizenship acquisition laws remain constant. We collected an original dataset on 589 municipalities in the 2006 local elections, and conduct our analysis using Poisson regression models for count data that incorporate alternative explanations. Findings suggest that Social Democratic parties face greater political and economic constraints than Green parties and these constraints are conditioned by cultural citizenship; in Flanders where cultural citizenship is characterized by a strong ethnic component constraints are greater for Social Democratic than Green parties, but in civic Wallonia both parties do not appear constrained by these factors. Finally, we control for the conditioning effect of cultural citizenship for parties of the right, Christian Democratic and Liberal; we find no such effect.

Keywords Immigrant-origin minority · Candidate nominations · Left parties · Right parties · Citizenship · Belgium

✉ Barbara Sgouraki Kinsey
Barbara.kinsey@ucf.edu

Yuksel Alper Ecevit
aecevit@cu.edu.tr; Alper.Ecevit@gmail.com

[1] Department of International Relations, Çukurova University, İİBF binasi 2.kat, 01330 Balcali Adana, Turkey

[2] School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs, University of Central Florida, 4297 Andromeda Loop N., Howard Phillips Hall 302, Orlando, FL 32816-1356, USA

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Immigration is changing the composition of electorates across Western European countries as increasing numbers of immigrants acquire citizenship and noncitizens have some form of voting rights in local elections. Despite their growing numbers and increasing political visibility immigrant-origin minorities remain underrepresented in local and national governments (Bloemraad and Schonwalder 2013; Dancygier et al. 2015). The nomination of candidates of non-Western origin[1] on party lists is viewed as an essential step toward their electoral mobilization and political representation in the host country. In this paper we use Belgium as our research grounds to examine the determinants of such nominations focusing on parties of the left, Social Democratic and Green. The left parties' traditional role as "defenders" of immigrants' rights, and liberal progressive multiculturalist approaches to immigration has important implications for immigrant-origin minorities' rights and political representation; our study sheds light on the factors that may impede and undermine this role.

Nomination of minority candidates on party lists may encourage immigrant-origin minority voters' electoral participation and include the articulation of their interests in policy debates thus widening the scope of deliberative decision-making and the expression of diverse interests (Wauters et al. 2016). Importantly, it results in descriptive representation that increases the legitimacy of the political system by signaling that those in the majority accept a particular group, which may also reinforce the group's political integration (Zwan et al. 2019; Bloemraad and Schonwalder 2013; Bloemraad 2013; Bird et al. 2011; Dancygier 2017). However, the determinants of such nominations remain largely understudied partly due to data limitations (Bloemraad and Schonwalder 2013; Dancygier 2013, 2017).

Explanations focus on strategic calculations and practices of political parties in their attempts to mobilize the immigrant-origin minority vote to gain electoral advantage but also minimize the resulting electoral costs related to potential defections of their native constituents to other political parties (Fonseca 2011; Dancygier 2013, 2017; Zingher and Farrer 2014). Understanding variation in such nominations therefore entails considering the factors that account for party constituents' opposition to the fielding of minority candidates (Dancygier 2013, 2017).

Based on this *electoral risk calculus* approach we estimate the effects of *political* (the vote share of radical right parties) *and economic* (unemployment, economic inequality) factors on the number of such nominations on party lists of the Left, Social Democratic and Green, across different *cultural citizenship* contexts; how these factors operate across such contexts has not been examined in the literature. We define cultural citizenship as the *dominant tradition* or *culture* "regarding who is

[1] In this study we use *minorities of immigrant-origin/background* and *non-Western (immigrant) origin* or *minority individuals* interchangeably; these terms refer to (a) legal resident immigrants and (b) Belgian citizens with an immigrant background originating from Turkey, Africa (including Morocco and Congo), and Asia (including Pakistan and India). The main non-Western immigrant groups in Belgium are Turkish, Moroccan, and to a lesser extent Congolese. When we discuss various studies in the literature we employ the specific term used in each study (for instance, *ethnic minority* or individuals *of foreign origin*, etc.)



a legitimate member of the nation state" (Weldon 2006, p. 332); this tradition determines partly the "salience of ethnic difference" (ibid., 333).

We argue that Social Democratic parties would incur larger electoral tradeoffs in nominating minority candidates than green parties. The former may risk the alienation of their native low-income core constituents that perceive minorities of immigrant background as an economic threat, or/and their defection to parties of the radical right; thus they may face greater political and economic constraints than green parties that, in addition to a strong ideological basis for immigrants' mobilization, have a constituency characterized by post-materialist and multicultural tendencies (Fonseca 2011, p. 117). Further, we expect these constraints to be conditioned by different cultural conceptualizations of citizenship, i.e. *ethnic* vs. *non-ethnic*. Ethnic citizenship is associated with a notion of national belonging based on ethnic criteria, i.e. language (Skenderovic 2001), in contrast to a civic notion of citizenship. We anticipate political and economic constraints for social democratic and green parties to be larger in ethnic than civic contexts, since the former are associated with lower levels of tolerance for immigrant-origin minorities (Maddens et al. 2000; Weldon 2006; Pehrson et al. 2009).

We constructed a unique dataset of candidate nominations by immigrant-origin background on social democratic and green parties' lists at the level of municipality in the 2006 local elections in Belgium. We use the first election non-citizen non-EU residents were allowed to vote thus eschewing potential endogenous effects; for instance, possible increased numbers of nominations in subsequent elections aimed at mobilizing the immigrant-origin minority vote may affect the exogenous variables in the model, i.e. the vote share of radical right parties.

We evaluate the hypotheses by means of Poisson models for count data that incorporate alternative explanations, and the analysis confirms our expectations. In addition, our findings show that social democratic parties are more constrained than green parties in Flanders but not in Wallonia; in Wallonia both parties appear not to be constrained by political and economic factors. Finally, we control for the conditioning effect of cultural citizenship for parties of the right, Christian Democratic and Liberal, and find no effect.

We proceed with a discussion of the selection of testing grounds, Belgium. Next we review the literature and formulate the theoretical framework, derive the main hypotheses and discuss alternative explanations we control for in our analysis. Then we describe the data, measurement and methodology, and findings. Finally, we conclude.

Testing grounds: Belgium

Belgium has one of the largest foreign populations[2] among European countries, and foreign residents non-EU citizens that have legally resided in Belgium for at least 5 years have local voting rights; they voted for the first time in the 2006 municipal

[2] In 2006, 12.1% of its population was foreign born, and 67.01% of this population was from EU member states, 9.0% from Morocco, 4.4% from Turkey, and 19.6% from all other countries (National Institute of Statistics, Belgium 2006).



elections (law 19 per 2004; Groenendijk 2008).[3] Belgium is characterized by liberal naturalization legislation (Jacobs 2011) and also compulsory voting with turnouts of more than 90% in local elections; large numbers of non-EU-origin immigrants have become citizens and virtually all of them turn out to vote (p. 39). These factors in conjunction with its electoral system make Belgium fertile grounds for party competition for the immigrant-origin minority vote.

Belgium's proportional representation using the *Imperiali* divisor, places no limit on the number of preferential votes cast, thus candidates can be elected even when their ranking on the party list is not favorable (Jacobs and Delwit 2011, p. 79). This electoral system allows for the emergence of the "ethnic vote" (Rea et al. 2010, p. 697). Specifically, the voters can vote either for the party list accepting the ranking of candidates, or for one or multiple candidates on the same list, that is, cast a preference vote (ibid.). The way seats are distributed to the candidates on the list favors the preference votes (ibid.).

Further, Belgium constitutes excellent experimental grounds for this inquiry due to regional differences in cultural citizenship while macro-level variables, electoral and citizenship acquisition laws, remain constant across the regions. Cultural citizenship in the region of Flanders has a strong ethnic component that underscores national belonging based on language, in contrast to a civic cultural citizenship in Wallonia. The municipalities in the Brussels-Capital region are not included in our analysis (we discuss this later in the paper.)

Finally, in Belgium, national parties are "crucial players" in local elections and local electoral results serve as indicators of parties' national electoral results and trends (Deschouwer 2012, p. 144). Compared to other Western European countries, local elections in Belgium are generally viewed by political party headquarters as very important and relevant strategically (Hooghe et al. 2010, p. 936). This is partly due to the considerable relative autonomy of Belgian municipalities in a large number of areas, including education, public safety, welfare, and local environment (ibid.). The significance of local elections for national parties increased dramatically following the increase in the size of municipalities in 1976 (when the number of municipalities was reduced from 2359 to 589) (Deschouwer 2012, p. 144). For the most part purely local lists gave way to local sections of national parties that use their national name and a national list number centralizing thus electoral campaigns (ibid.). In sum, the role of municipality elections for local and national politics in Belgium suggests that political parties would monitor closely the composition of their party lists taking into consideration electoral tradeoffs and expected electoral margins at the municipality level. The political parties included in this analysis are Social Democratic and Green on the Left, and Christian Democratic and Liberal on the Right. In Belgium, each of these parties is divided into two different unilingual parties, Dutch-speaking and French-speaking (Deschouwer 2012, p. 79). The former in Flanders are Socialist Party *different* (sp.a), Flemish Greens (Groen), Christian

[3] Foreign residents have voting rights (but are not eligible to stand as candidates) at the local level, not the regional or federal levels. Citizens of EU states have had the right to vote in local elections and also stand as candidates since 2000.



Democrat and Flemish (CD&V), and Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Open VLD). Their respective French-speaking parties in Wallonia are Socialist Party (PS), Ecolo, Democratic Humanist Centre (CDH), and Reformist Movement (MR).

Parties of the left and nomination of candidates of non-Western origin: political opportunity and electoral tradeoffs

Studies of nominations of candidates of non-Western origin on party lists use elections at both local and national levels and, for the most part, focus on parties of the left. Such nominations are viewed as the means for mobilizing the immigrant-origin minority vote for electoral advantage (Fonseca 2011; Dancygier 2013, 2017; Zinger and Farrer 2014).

Center-left parties in particular are associated with the mobilization of minority voters of immigrant background (Bilodeau 2016; Jacobs and Delwit 2011) and the nomination of candidates of non-Western origin on their party lists (Sobolewska 2013). That immigrant-origin minority voters are more likely to vote for center-left parties compared to the majority population is a common finding in single-country studies including Belgium (Jacobs and Delwit 2011; Jacobs et al. 2016), the Netherlands (Van Heelsum et al. 2016), the United Kingdom (Saggar 2016; Dancygier 2013), Germany (Wüst 2011), the Scandinavian countries (Bergh and Bjorklund 2011a, b; Mikkelsen 2011; Tahvilzadeh 2011), Canada and Australia (White and Bilodeau 2014; Zingher and Farrer 2014), among others. In the case of Belgium a study conducted in three municipalities in Brussels-Capital in the 2006 local election, confirms a gap of an average of 27.8 percentage points between ethnic minority and ethnic majority support for the Socialist Party (PS) (Teney et al. 2010; Jacobs et al. 2016). The gap for the environmental party, on the other hand, is in the *opposite* direction, an average of 13 percentage points (ibid.). In addition, after controlling for social and demographic factors including education, socioeconomic background and gender, ethnic origin has a significant impact on vote choice, mainly for the PS (ibid.; see also Jacobs et al. 2002; Rea et al. 2010). In their case study of two Belgian cities in Flanders, Antwerp and Ghent, based on interviews with party officials and ethnic minority candidates, councilors, and representatives of ethnic organizations regarding the 2006 local election, Eelbode et al. (2013) find that the Socialist party is viewed as attracting most of the ethnic minority vote and candidates because of its traditional socioeconomic and cultural values (p. 7); ethnic minorities support the Green party also because of its views on immigrant integration, and interest in and contact with ethnic communities, but to a lesser extent because the party's post-materialist views and emphasis on the environment do not resonate with ethnic minorities' main concern for "more practical" issues such as employment and housing (ibid.). The authors conclude that ethnic minority voters support mostly leftist parties and the Socialist party in particular (p. 8). Further, exit surveys conducted in the 2004 regional and 2007 legislative elections in Belgium find that more than 40% of Muslim voters vote for the PS in Brussels-Capital and Wallonia (Sandri and De Decker 2008; Zibouh 2013).



The support of immigrant-origin minority voters for the left is attributed partly to nominations of candidates of non-Western origin fielded for the most part by parties of the center-left (Fonseca 2011; Bergh and Bjorklund 2011b; Dancygier 2017; Zingher and Farrer 2014; Jacobs et al. 2016). Country case studies show that compared to voters with no immigrant background voters of immigrant origin tend to vote for immigrant-origin candidates (Jacobs et al. 2016, p. 59; Van Heelsum et al. 2016; Zwan et al. 2019) and also those of their own ethnic backgrounds (Bergh and Bjorklund 2011a, p. 88; Otjes and Krouwel 2019). Jacobs et al. (2016) show that when controlling for other factors, voters of foreign origin are "still significantly more likely to cast a preferential vote" for a candidate of foreign descent than voters of the majority group (p. 59). According to Wauters and Eelbode (2011), ethnic voters casting a vote for ethnic candidates is very common in Brussels and elsewhere (p. 43). In their study of the electoral effects of the nomination of ethnic minority candidates by parties of the center-left at national elections in Australia and the United Kingdom, Zingher and Farrer (2014, p. 8) show that these parties can expect about a 10-percentage increase in ethnic minority support.

But while political parties may include immigrant background minority candidates in their party lists to compete for the immigrant-origin minority vote, in these attempts they would also take into account the immigrant/native divide. As Przeworski and Sprague (1986, p. 60) have shown "if a party appeals to one constituency, it may suffer in its relation to some other constituency." The strategic dilemma that political parties face in countries with a sizeable enfranchised immigrant population is well noted in the literature: "… if one party moves towards the immigrants, the others may try to capitalize on this among natives" (Fonseca 2011, p. 117).

The nomination of minority candidates signals a minority-friendly agenda that includes immigrant policy concerns that political parties may defend and advance (Bilodeau 2016, p. 226; Saggar 2016; Eelbode et al. 2013). Therefore as center-left parties signal their aim to enhance immigrant-origin minority political representation via the nomination of non-Western candidates, they may risk alienating those core voters (Fonseca 2011) that perceive immigrant-origin minorities as a cultural and/or economic threat and fear the implementation of an agenda favoring such interests at the expense of their own (Fonseca 2011; Dancygier 2013). Zingher and Farrer (2014) find that when parties of the center-left nominate ethnic minority candidates they increase support among minority voters but on some occasions there is a backlash by white voters in the district (p. 8); based on this finding they conclude that parties would nominate minority candidates where perceived electoral benefits outweigh risks (ibid.). This is also confirmed in Dancygier's (2013) study of Muslim candidate selection by the Labour Party in English local elections between 2002 and 2010. This electoral risk calculation entails taking into account the conditions under which their constituents are likely to oppose such inclusion (ibid.; Dancygier 2017). For instance, parties of the center-left may avoid nominating candidates of an immigrant background in economically deprived areas or where xenophobic attitudes are prevalent (Fonseca 2011; Dancygier 2013).

We anticipate therefore that parties of the center-left may be reluctant to nominate candidates of non-Western origin where they expect a greater electoral backlash, that is in municipalities where they face electoral competition from the radical



right, and municipalities with higher levels of unemployment and economic inequality where low-income supporters may fear a shift of limited economic resources to immigrant-origin minorities who also tend to be socioeconomically disadvantaged. We argue that such political and economic effects vary across different parties and conditioned by different cultural citizenship contexts.

Political and economic conditions for nominations of candidates of non-Western immigrant origin in Belgium[4]

A number of studies examine the electoral challenge the radical right presents for social democratic parties (Bale et al. 2010; Coffé 2008; Norris 2005). According to Bale et al. (2010) radical right parties compete for center left voters in blue-collar occupations, the unemployed, and casual labor (p. 412), and appeal to these groups both "on the authoritarian end of the authoritarian-libertarian dimension but also on the left side of the state-market dimension" (ibid.; Van Spanje and Van der Brug 2005; De Lange 2007). As other social democratic parties in Europe both socialist parties in Belgium, PS in Wallonia and sp.a in Flanders, have lost votes to the radical right (Coffé 2008).

This challenge is not looming as large for green parties. Evidently, as other green voters in Europe green voters in Belgium constitute a young and well educated, post-materialist electorate inclined toward multiculturalism (Deschouwer 2012, p. 97). Both the Ecolo in Wallonia and the Groen! in Flanders are electorally more successful in municipalities where electorates are more educated and wealthier (Hooghe et al. 2010, p. 944). Further, Hooghe et al. (2010, p. 944) find that the Green parties' stand on multiculturalism contributed to their electoral success in the 2000 and 2006 municipal elections. Therefore, we expect that the PS (Wallonia) and sp.a (Flanders) would be more reluctant to field candidates of non-Western origin on their party lists in municipalities with higher levels of radical right support than their respective green parties, Ecolo and Groen!.

Further, in the literature anti-immigrant attitudes among voters are associated with economic factors, including the levels of unemployment and economic inequality. According to Tajfel and Turner (1979) people who are considered to be outgroups are more likely to be perceived as competitors for scarce resources and to be made targets in political conflict. Municipality council members of non-Western origin may be viewed by native voters as consequential to a potential shifting of resources to immigrant-origin minorities, especially in Belgium where the local level of governance in its "role of co-producer of public goods" can have a substantial relative impact on the citizens' daily life (Deschouwer 2012; see also Dancygier

[4] Nomination of candidates of non-Western origin in Belgium dates back to early 1990s. Francophone and Flemish parties have been nominating non-Western immigrant candidates, beginning with the Francophone parties in the 1994 municipal elections; the Flemish parties followed in the 1999 Regional elections (Bousetta et al. 2005). In the 2006 municipal elections seven of the elected Socialist councilors in Antwerp, about one-third of the total, were Muslim immigrants, and six of them were new in politics (Belien 2006).



2013, 2017). Therefore, fearing their constituents' defection political parties may be reluctant to field candidates of non-Western origin in municipalities where unemployment and economic inequality are relatively high. The economic effects on party nominations of candidates of non-Western origin are anticipated to be negative and larger for social democratic parties than Green parties.

Now, we expect these political and economic effects to vary across variant cultural citizenship contexts in Belgium. To be sure, the PS and sp.a on one hand, and the Ecolo and Groen! on the other are not equal in electoral strength; we address this later in the paper.

Electoral tradeoffs across cultural citizenship contexts

The effects of radical right support, unemployment, and economic inequality on the nomination of candidates of non-Western immigrant-origin by parties of the left may vary across distinct cultural citizenship contexts, ethnic and civic. Citizenship contexts are typically identified at the national level (Brubaker 1989; Weldon 2006; Howard 2009). Now, in ethnic cultural citizenship contexts national identity is framed in ethno-cultural terms, i.e. language, culture, and history (Skenderovic 2001; Martiniello 1995); on the other hand, civic citizenship is associated with the principle that the nation is a political community based on the constitution and rule of law (Martiniello 1995).

According to Martiniello (1995), Wallonia's cultural citizenship type is civic; newcomers can be members of the community provided they respect the constitution and laws. Flanders' cultural citizenship on the other hand is described as multicultural with a strong ethnic component (Jacobs 2004; Jacobs and Rea 2007; Adams 2013); the latter derives from an emphasis on common language and culture, and defines public discourse on the conception of national identity and related immigrant integration approaches. For Martiniello (2001, p. 282), "the dominant conception of the nation" in Flanders and Wallonia shapes the internal debate on immigration. In Flemish politics, the notion of *kulturnation* associated with the protection of cultural heritage "has shaped the terms of the debate opposing multiculturalism and its defenders;" in Wallonia, the dominance of the "idea of *staatnation*… impose(s) the local version of assimilationism within the framework of a general strategy designed to deal with economic crisis" (ibid.), that is defend "common socio-economic interests in the Belgian state, not… a Walloon cultural heritage" (Maddens et al. 2000, p. 48). Survey data on attitudes toward foreigners appear consistent with these views; respondents in Flanders are "more concerned about maintaining their own culture" (Billiet et al. 2006, p. 912), while in Wallonia they are "more concerned about the alleged economic and social threat" (ibid.).

These different citizenship contexts are reflected in the design of regional integration policy. Unlike most other European countries, in Belgium while formal citizenship rules are under the authority of the federal government, the regional level has the authority to implement integration policies for immigrants (Pulinx and Van Avermaet 2015, p. 343). Since 2000 citizenship rules in Belgium have been



characterized as the most lenient in Europe and do not require language or other integration procedures (ibid. 344). However, regional integration policies vary across Flanders and Wallonia. Since the early 1990s "*inburgering* ("Citizenisation") policy" in Flanders "promotes higher cultural conformity through an integration program including (compulsory) Flemish language courses, social orientation courses and information about the values and norms of the Flemish society" (Mandin 2014); in Wallonia, on the other hand, integration programs are not mandatory and do not include instruction on societal "values and norms" (ibid. 12). Further, the former are characterized as predominantly interventionist-assimilationist, and the latter as laissez-faire-multiculturalist (Adam 2011).

In the literature ethnic citizenship contexts are associated with lower levels of cultural and political tolerance toward immigrant groups compared to civic contexts (Weldon 2006; Pehrson et al. 2009). Further, Weldon's (2006) study finds lower levels of tolerance in states with citizenship policies that are based on ethnic criteria.

We anticipate that in ethnic citizenship contexts parties of the left would likely expect overall larger electoral tradeoffs than in civic contexts. So, we argue that in Flanders social democratic and green parties would be more reluctant to field candidates of non-Western origin in municipalities with higher levels of right radical support, unemployment, and economic inequality than in Wallonia.

Influence of demographic, social, electoral and institutional factors

The *presence of non-Western immigrants* in the municipality would be positively associated with party nominations of non-Western candidates as parties appeal to the immigrant-origin minority vote (Dancygier 2017; Nikolic 2015). In addition, we control for the effects of *median income* and *education*, both found in the literature to be associated with anti-immigrant voter attitudes. Political parties may find it electorally risky to field non-Western origin candidates in municipalities with higher numbers of voters of low socioeconomic status. Further, we account for an electoral factor, the *strength of the party in the municipality*. We expect a negative relationship between the party's electoral strength in the municipal council since the previous local election and number of nominations of candidates of non-Western origin; we hypothesize that political parties, all else equal, mobilize the immigrant-origin minority vote to increase their electoral support and seats in municipal councils. Finally, we evaluate the effect of an institutional factor, *district magnitude* on number of nominations. How electoral rules may affect party incentives in nominating women and minority candidates is well researched in the literature, and proportionality of representation systems is found to be associated with greater representation of women and minorities. We expect that as district magnitude increases the electoral risk of nominating non-Western candidates may decrease since the pool of party candidates becomes larger. In addition**,** district magnitude serves as a control for the total number of nominations made by the party in the municipality, since the two variables are highly correlated.



Recruitment processes across parties

Differences in recruitment procedures of the PS, sp.a, Ecolo and Groen! would raise the question whether the hypothesized differences in the political and economic effects on minority nominations across parties and citizenship contexts are in part the result of such procedures, specifically binding quotas and formation of electoral lists. Based on the description that follows it appears that all four parties have no binding minority candidate quotas and the formation of party lists rests mainly with party elites.

According to Devos et al. (2008, pp. 66, 70), the Groen! and Ecolo aim at presenting balanced party lists between Belgian candidates and those of non-Western origin; however none of the four parties have *binding* targets for the inclusion of minority candidates on their lists (ibid.). For the formation of the electoral lists, the PS relies on ad hoc committees and the sp.a primarily on the party president (ibid.). For both Ecolo and Groen! the local group assembly decides the formation of the electoral lists, while the role of the respective party presidents is limited (ibid). However, the quorum for local group assemblies is only five members. Further, the Ecolo's federation council has the authority to adopt co-decision procedures for the preparation of the electoral lists (Statuts D' Ecolo, 2013), while the Groen!'s national political council determines the rules and conditions governing the candidates' lists (Statuten Groen! 2011). Evidently, differences in recruitment procedures are not sufficiently large to be intervening variables in this analysis.

Measurement, data and methodology

We conduct the analysis at the level of the municipality in the Flemish and Walloon regions. In Belgium there are 589 municipal counselors of cities and towns, 308 in the Flemish region and 262 in the Walloon region, and 19 in the Brussels-Capital region. The Brussels-Capital region is very different from the other regions in relation to its population characteristics, citizenship culture, and politics (Jacobs 2007), thus we exclude it from our analyses.

The dependent variable in this study is number of candidates of non-Western immigrant origin on party lists. We constructed a unique and extensive dataset by collecting candidate nomination data for parties of the left and right including the ethnic background of candidates for the 2006 municipal elections. We identified candidates of non-Western origin as members of a "visible minority" using name analysis (Bloemraad 2013). Now, identification of ethnic background of candidates based on name analysis may be a challenging task. Women may change their name after marriage or minorities may have Belgian last names (ibid. 657). Therefore we expect some random error, but have no reason to expect systematic error.

To measure competition from the radical right, we use the percent vote for anti-immigrant parties of the extreme right in Belgium, Vlaams Belang (Flanders) and Front National (Wallonia), in the previous municipal election, that of 2000. The *Vlaams Belang* (Flemish Interest) (and prior to 2004 *Vlaams Blok*) was founded in



1978, and in the late 1980s it focused on immigration (Coffé et al. 2007). The *Front National Belge* party was founded in 1985 and was the major anti-immigrant party in Wallonia. Both parties called for higher barriers to naturalization, preferential treatment of nationals in the labor market or with regard to their civil, political, and social rights. Vlaams Belang had been described as one of the electorally successful radical right parties in Europe (Coffé 2008) while the Front National's basis of support remained weak and unstable (ibid.; Jamin 2012) until its demise in 2012. However, there is variation in the distribution of the radical right vote across municipalities in Flanders and Wallonia (for summary statistics see Appendix I, Tables 3 and 4).

We measure unemployment as the difference in the rate of unemployment between the months of August and April prior to the October 2006 local elections, since decisions on party nominations take place a few months before the election. The measure of economic inequality is the Gini coefficient for 2006.

Log of immigrant population is population with African, Turkish, and Asian nationalities in 2006 (Population Par Nationalité, Statistics Belgium). Clearly, this is a conservative measure of non-Western immigrant-origin population since Belgian *citizens* of foreign origin are not classified by country of origin. *Strength of the party in the municipality* is measured as the party's percent of seats at the municipal council in the previous local election in 2000. *Education* is the percent of adults with a primary education in the municipality.

Demographic, social and economic data on Belgian municipalities were provided by the National Institute of Statistics in Belgium (Direction Generale de la Statistique et de l'Information Economic) and election data were made available by the Service Elections (SPF Interieur). Unemployment data were accessed at ONEM unemployment service (Bureau Chomage, Office national de l'Emploi). The number of seats in the local councils (district magnitude) in 2006 was made available to the authors by Marc Hooghe (see Hooghe et al. 2010).

In our analysis we include those municipalities in Flanders and Wallonia where the PS, sp.a, Ecolo, and Groen! fielded candidates and participated in the election alone, not in coalition with other political parties; that is, this study focuses on national parties' lists in local elections, not local or cartel lists (Steyvers et al. 2008). In the October 2006 municipal elections in Belgium, the socialist parties nominated a total of 7292 candidates and of those, 188 (2.58%) were of non-Western origin. The respective figures for the green parties are 6066 and 124 (2.04%). The number of minority candidates nominated by the socialist parties is 58 of 3841 total nominated in Flanders (1.5%) and 56 of 3004 nominated in Wallonia (1.86%). The respective figures for the green parties are 37 of 2413 in Flanders (1.53%) and 30 of 3026 in Wallonia (0.99).[5]

As noted earlier, we use count data, number of candidates of non-Western immigrant origin on party lists, as the dependent variable. Using count data instead of percent of non-Western immigrant origin candidates on the party lists is appropriate

[5] In Brussels-Capital the Socialist Party nominated 74 minority candidates out of a total of 447 or 16.55%; the respective figures for Ecolo nominations are 57 out of a total of 627 or 9.09%.



for this analysis due to the *visibility* of candidates of non-Western origin. For the most part such candidates are easily identifiable by the voters and more importantly they are likely to be actively engaged in electoral campaigns in the municipality to mobilize the immigrant-origin minority vote. Therefore we expect that the *number* of such nominations is more likely to figure in parties' electoral decisions than the percent of total nominations on their party lists. Thus for estimation we use Poisson regression models with the robust option for more reliable standard errors and confidence intervals in the presence of heteroskedasticity. We obtain estimates from four different models: by region and party. Negative binomial models with robust option yield virtually identical results.

We also estimate models by political party with interaction terms, interacting each of our independent variables with region (1 = Flanders, 0 = Wallonia) for a direct comparison with the models described above (see Appendix II, Table 5 for estimated coefficients, and Table 6A and B for predicted counts). For the most part, the main predicted effects in the interaction models match those in the models applied across regions.

Analysis results

Table 1 shows the results of the analysis by party and region.

As expected, *radical right vote* in the citizenship context of Flanders has a negative and significant effect on the sp.a's nominations of minority candidates; however in the case of the PS in the civic context of Wallonia the effect is in the opposite direction and significant. In Flanders, for an increase in mean radical right vote share of one standard deviation, from 7 to 14%, the predicted count decrease is 0.63 (see Appendix I, Table 3A, B, C, and D for predicted counts); for instance, as the radical right vote increases from 7 to 24%, the sp.a is likely to field one less minority candidate. Figure 1 shows the marginal effect of increases in the radical vote share on the number of candidates fielded by the socialist party in Flanders.

Now, how can we explain the *positive and significant* effect in the case of the PS in civic Wallonia? The role of the PS as a "firm socialist pillar" in Wallonia/Brussels regions may contribute to this finding (Coffé 2008). We will discuss this further later in the paper.

Radical right vote share has no effect on green party nominations of candidates of non-Western origin across regions.

Contrary to expectation, *unemployment* is not significant across parties and regions; however, *economic inequality* has the expected negative effect in the case of the sp.a in Flanders where the decrease in the predicted count of candidates is 0.48 for an increase of a standard deviation in mean economic inequality; for instance, as economic inequality increases from 0.28 to 0.36, the sp.a is likely to field about one less minority candidate. Figure 2 shows the marginal effect of increases in economic inequality on the number of candidates fielded by the socialist party in Flanders. In Wallonia economic effects are not significant.

Our findings suggest that in Flanders economic inequality does not constrain the Groen!



Table 1 Estimates of the effects of political, economic, and institutional factors on the nomination of non-Western candidates on party lists of parties of the left in Belgium by region. 2006 local elections

	Non-Western immigrant nominations			
	Socialist parties		Green parties	
	Regions		Regions	
	Flanders	Wallonia	Flanders	Wallonia
	sp.a	PS	Groen!	Ecolo
Radical right vote share (2000)	− 9.93**	13.85**	− 3.19	14.88*
	(3.36)	(5.95)	(3.59)	(8.408)
Unemployment change	− 35.63	43.75*	44.12	13.14
	(24.50)	(23.10)	(28.03)	(33.38)
Economic inequality (gini)	− 52.55***	− 3.00	− 33.53	0.093
	(12.71)	(9.28)	(20.66)	(11.01)
Log(immigrant population)	1.51***	0.540**	2.02***	0.556**
	(.248)	(0.258)	(0.588)	(0.272)
%Council seats (2000)	− 0.031**	− 0.001	− 0.005	0.006
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.0428)	(0.026)
District magnitude	0.002	− 0.018	− 0.133**	− 0.013
	(0.046)	(0.025)	(0.062)	(0.025)
Median income	0.0004**	− 0.0001	0.0005*	0.00006
	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)
Percent with primary education	− 0.311	− 16.69	− 3.495	17.38
	(7.17)	(11.45)	(12.24)	(14.27)
Constant	− 1.74	− 1.11	− 9.44	− 7.10
	(5.04)	(3.43)	(6.783)	(4.90)
Prob > chi^2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R^2	0.4990	0.4033	0.5414	0.2296
N	160	132	108	148

Poisson Regression Results. Robust errors

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses; tests for overdispersion were negative; the model functional form approximates the distribution of the data

*$p \leq .1$ **$p \leq .05$ ***$p \leq .001$

Sources Immigrant populations, median income, economic inequality, and percent with primary education provided by National Institute of Statistics in Belgium (Direction Generale de la Statistique et de l'Information Economic). Unemployment accessed at ONEM unemployment service (Bureau Chomage, Office national de l'Emploi). Election data provided by the Service Elections (SPF Interieur). District magnitude was made available by Marc Hooghe

In sum, our expectation that social democratic parties would be more constrained than Green parties in nominating non-Western candidates as they would be likely to incur larger electoral tradeoffs is confirmed in Flanders, but not Wallonia. In Flanders, the sp.a is constrained by radical right vote share and economic inequality

Table 2 Estimates of the effects of political, economic, and institutional factors on the nomination of non-Western candidates on party lists of parties of the right in Belgium by region. 2006 local elections

	Non-Western immigrant nominations			
	Christian democratic parties		Liberal parties	
	Regions		Regions	
	Flanders	Wallonia	Flanders	Wallonia
	CD&V	CDH	VLD	MR
Radical right vote share (2000)	− 2.35	− 8.614	− 5.128	− 10.091
	(2.7)	(7.892)	(3.3)	(7.526)
Unemployment change	− 30.583	− 6.084	− 17.266	− 21.96
	(22.738)	(39.437)	(31.8)	(29.742)
Economic inequality (gini)	− 34.078***	− 22.259**	1.934	− 8.623
	(9.517)	(10.658)	(6.982)	(11.149)
Log(Immigrant Population)	1.885***	0.89**	1.715**	1.272***
	(0.23)	(0.3036)	(0.634)	(0.305)
%Council seats (2000)	0.009	− 0.0018	− 0.036**	0.004
	(0.0146)	(0.0142)	(0.013)	(0.014)
District magnitude	− 0.1298**	− 0.0575	− 0.172*	− 0.073**
	(0.042)	(0.0383)	(0.101)	(0.034)
Median income	0.0002	− 0.0001	− 0.0004**	− 0.000005
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)
Percent with primary education	− 5.249	− 21.175	− 9.016	15.86
	(8.003)	(14.889)	(11.502)	(12.102)
Constant	− 3.085	7.262	3.577	− 4.886
	(5.496)	(4.223)	(3.543)	(3.643)
Prob > chi^2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R^2	0.5660	0.3899	0.5450	0.4164
N	257	85	199	96

Poisson Regression Results. Robust errors

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses; tests for overdispersion were negative; the model functional form approximates the distribution of the data

*$p \leq .1$ **$p \leq .05$ ***$p \leq .001$

Sources Immigrant populations, median income, economic inequality, and percent with primary education provided by National Institute of Statistics in Belgium (Direction Generale de la Statistique et de l'Information Economic). Unemployment accessed at ONEM unemployment service (Bureau Chomage, Office national de l'Emploi). Election data provided by the Service Elections (SPF Interieur). District magnitude was made available by Marc Hooghe

while the Groen! is not; in Wallonia, on the other hand neither the PS nor the Ecolo appear constrained by these factors.

An important finding in this analysis is that the effect of the *presence of immigrant population* is in the direction expected and significant across regions. Evidently, political parties of the left nominate non-Western candidates to appeal to the






Fig. 1 Marginal effect of change in radical right vote share on number of candidates of non-Western immigrant origin nominated on Socialist party lists in Flanders ($N = 160$ municipalities)




Fig. 2 Marginal effect of change in economic inequality on number of candidates of non-Western immigrant origin nominated on Socialist party lists in Flanders ($N = 160$ municipalities)

immigrant voter. Further, the effect of *median income* is positive and significant in the case of sp.a in Flanders but not in Wallonia (in the case of the Groen! it is also positive but only significant at $p \leq 0.07$). This suggests that the sp.a may field less candidates of non-Western immigrant origin in municipalities with lower median income; for instance, as median income increases from 19,000 to 24,000, the sp.a is likely to field about one more minority candidate. In addition, with the exception in the case of Groen!, the non-significant effect of *district magnitude* may be due to its high positive correlation (0.88) to immigrant population across municipalities; for the most part, there are large concentrations of immigrant populations in urban municipalities that have large district magnitudes.



Parties of the right in the 2006 local elections in Belgium

In this section, we control for the conditioning effect of cultural citizenship for parties of the two main political positions on the Right in the 2006 local elections: Christian Democratic, Christian Democrat and Flemish (CD&V) in Flanders, and Democratic Humanist Center (CDH) in Wallonia; and Liberal, Flemish Liberals and Democrats (VLD) in Flanders, and Reformist Movement (MR) in Wallonia. Our main objective is to control for *inclusion costs* expected to vary across parties on the Left and the Right. Our argument is that cultural citizenship conditions factors, political and economic, likely to affect parties' number of nominations of candidates of non-Western immigrant origin, and these factors operate via the party constituency's characteristics and competition from the radical right. What constraints may parties of the Right face in the cultural citizenship contexts of Flanders and Wallonia?

We estimate the same models across regions (see Appendix I, Table 4A, B, C, and D for summary statistics and predicted counts), including models with interaction terms, interacting each of our independent variables with region (1 = Flanders, 0 = Wallonia) for a comparison with the regional models (see Appendix II, Table 7 for estimated coefficients, and Table 8A and B for predicted counts). We find that the main predicted effects in the interaction models match those in the models applied across regions.

As noted earlier in the paper, all parties may seek to mobilize the immigrant-origin minority vote; although these voters have a strong tendency to vote for parties on the Left, findings in the literature show that they may vote for all parties of the political spectrum (Jacobs and Delwit 2011; Jacobs et al. 2016). For instance, using exit polls in the 2006 local election, Jacobs and al. show that immigrant-origin voters "do not vote solely for the left; an important proportion supports the center-right list of the incumbent mayor" (p. 53).

In the October 2006 municipal elections in Belgium, Christian Democratic parties nominated a total of 8,748 candidates and of those 147 (1.68%) were of non-Western origin; in Flanders the respective figures are 6,313 and 38 (0.6%), and in Wallonia 2,083 and 59 (2.8%). The Liberal parties nominated a total of 7,705 candidates and of those 97 (1.26%) were of non-Western origin; in Flanders the respective figures are 4,976 and 27 (0.54%), and in Wallonia 2,306 and 39 (1.7%).[6] Overall (but not in Wallonia) right parties nominated a smaller percent of candidates of non-Western origin on their lists than parties of the left, particularly in Flanders where nominations by the CD&V and VLD were 0.6 and 0.54% respectively.

Eelbode et al. (2013) found that in Flanders parties of the right had poor networks among ethnic communities and also a relative disadvantage in mobilizing the ethnic minority vote since it appears that "most of the values and standpoints espoused by the rightist parties (are) perceived negatively by ethnic minorities" (p. 7). In particular, the individualist values of the Liberal party may not appeal to the family and

[6] In Brussels-Capital the CDH nominated 50 minority candidates out of a total of 352 or 14.2%; the respective figures for the Liberal Party nominations (VLD and MR) are 31 out of a total of 423 or 7.3%.



community oriented values among many ethnic minorities; and although in principle the Liberal party may attract the growing numbers of the self-employed among ethnic origin voters, in practice its opposition to the enfranchisement for immigrants (Jacobs 1999) and support for the ban of the headscarf "turned off potential supporters" (Eelbode et al. 2013, p. 7). In the case of the Christian Democratic party the issue of religion may alienate potential supporters, since a large number among them are Muslim (ibid., 7).

Now, this same issue of religion, may make the Christian Democratic party more vulnerable to potential electoral tradeoffs occurring from placing candidates of non-Western origin, and specifically Muslim candidates, on their party lists than their Liberal counterparts with a constituency of employers and the self-employed (Deschouwer 2012). In addition, Christian Democratic parties tend to occupy the social and economic center and to the left of the Liberal parties (Laver and Benoit 2006) which may make them more vulnerable to the mobilizing efforts of the populist radical parties as they appeal to voters based on anti-immigrant rhetoric portraying immigrants as an economic and cultural threat (Bale et al. 2010). Therefore, the Christian Democratic Party may be more constrained than the Liberal Party across regions.

Further, the CD&V and VLD may face less competition from the radical right in Flanders than the CDH and MR in Wallonia due to their positions on immigration and territorial reform policy. Both parties adopted a position in support of a "further territorial reform of the Belgian state" (Deschouwer 2013) and also a relatively more protectionist position on immigration policy than their counterparts in Wallonia robbing thus to a certain extent the separatist and radical Vlaams Belang from its 'separatist' dimension of competition. Between 2004 and 2007 the CD&V formed an electoral alliance with the N-VA "the successor party to Volksunie which advocated an independent Flanders" (ibid.: 341). In 1992 the Liberal Party (VLD) "moved into a more Flemish regionalist direction" welcoming former leaders of the Volksunie (Deschouwer 2012, p. 88). This suggests that parties of the Right in Flanders may not be more constrained than their counterparts in Wallonia.

Now, the policy positions of CD&V and VLD coupled with a record of poor connections with immigrant-origin minority communities suggest that the CD&V and VLD may nominate non-Western minority candidates "symbolically" (Dancygier 2017). According to Dancygier (2017), parties engage in symbolic inclusion when they do not "necessarily appeal to a large number of minority voters" (p. 6). Instead parties signal they are aware of minority voters and the importance to diversify their ranks; also they select minority candidates whose policy preferences are in line with those of core constituents and party positions (pp. 6–7). The sp.a and PS, on the other hand, engage in "vote-based inclusion" that is, they field non-Western candidates that appeal to the non-Western electorate at large (Eelbode et al. 2013; Jacobs et al. 2016), and therefore are likely to face "sharper" electoral tradeoffs than the CD&V and VLD.

We explore similar conditioning effects of cultural citizenship for parties on the Right as those for left parties: generally, in Flanders, Christian Democratic and Liberal parties would face more (or the same) constraints than (as) in Wallonia; in addition, Christian Democratic parties may be more constrained than their Liberal



counterparts across regions. However, we expect the constraints on both parties on the Right to be less than those faced by the social democratic party in Flanders.

Table 2 shows the results of the analysis by party and region.

Our findings show that cultural citizenship does not condition the political and economic effects on the number of nominations for parties on the Right. Only economic inequality has the anticipated effect on nominations in the case of the Christian Democratic Party and its effect is negative, significant, and about the same in both Flanders and Wallonia: as economic inequality increases from its minimum to its maximum the Christian Democratic party is likely to field one less minority candidate. The effect of median income is negative and significant in the case of the Liberals in Flanders, suggesting that the MR may field less candidates of minority ethnic origin in municipalities with higher median income; however, its substantive impact is small: the decrease in the predicted count of candidates is 0.04 for an increase of a standard deviation in mean median income. As in the case of the left parties, an important finding is the positive and significant effect of the *presence of immigrant population* across regions. Evidently, political parties on the Right seek sizable immigrant-origin minority electorates to field non-Western candidates.

In sum, our analysis shows that Christian Democratic Parties face greater economic constraints than the Liberal parties, however, these constraints do not vary across cultural citizenship contexts. Our findings suggest that the socialist party *alone* among these parties of the left and right faces greater constraints in the cultural citizenship context of Flanders than in civic Wallonia. This provides support for the proposition that larger electoral trade-offs are likely to accompany "vote-based inclusion."

Conclusion

To understand the political representation of immigrant-origin minorities it is important to examine the role of "party gatekeepers" in the electoral process (Zwan et al. 2019; Dancygier et al. 2015, 2017). Our study focuses on parties of the left and the analysis contributes to this literature by examining variation in the number of nominations of candidates of non-Western origin by parties on the Left and also Right across different cultural citizenship settings. In nominating such candidates political parties may risk the defection of native constituents that perceive minorities of immigrant origin as an economic and/or cultural threat. Our study identifies specific conditions for such electoral tradeoffs and examines their effects on nominations. It focuses on political (electoral support for the radical right) and economic (unemployment and economic inequality) constraints, and compares the effects of such constraints across different parties of the left, social democratic and green parties, and parties of the right, Christian democratic and liberal parties, in variant cultural citizenship contexts.

We use the case of the 2006 local elections in Belgium and find that the socialist party faces greater constraints than Green and Right parties. Our findings suggest that in Flanders, where cultural citizenship is characterized by a strong ethnic component, the socialist party expects to incur larger electoral tradeoffs and thus may



be reluctant to field such candidates in municipalities where it faces higher political and economic constraints than in the civic context of Wallonia. Further, our analysis shows that the socialist party *alone* among these parties of the left and right faces greater constraints in the cultural citizenship context of Flanders than in civic Wallonia; we do not find similar effects in the case of the Green parties and parties of the right. With the exception of the Christian Democratic Party, it appears that parties face no such constraints in civic Wallonia.

Our findings are consistent with findings in the literature on the role of electoral tradeoffs between immigrant-origin minority and native support for the entry of minority candidates in the party system. Studies on nominations of candidates of non-Western origin on party lists have to consider electoral tradeoffs and the conditions that account for variation in such tradeoffs. Our study does not only show that economic and political factors may be important in determining how reluctant parties may be to field candidates of non-Western origin, but also suggests how expected electoral tradeoffs may vary across parties of the left and right, and the conditioning effects of different types of cultural citizenship. One condition for variation in electoral tradeoffs across parties would be whether parties practice "symbolic inclusion" or "vote-based inclusion" of immigrant-origin minority candidates and voters (Dancygier 2017). Our study's findings provide support for this proposition; cultural citizenship contexts sharpen electoral tradeoffs for parties practicing "vote-based inclusion."

Sides and Citrin (2007) demonstrate the importance of the influence of national identities that is "beliefs about cultural unity and homogeneity" on European public attitudes on immigration (p. 501) and find a "significant relationship between a preference of cultural unity and opposition to immigration" (ibid.). Such national identities are expected to be more widespread and held more deeply in ethnic than non-ethnic citizenship contexts. As noted earlier, our study suggests that such contexts are linked to the electoral tradeoffs expected by political parties. Therefore, the type of cultural citizenship may be linked to the extent and pace of the political incorporation of immigrant-origin minorities in the party system.

A puzzling finding of our study is the *absence* of economic and political effects on immigrant-origin minority candidate nominations by the socialist party in Wallonia. Arguably, the extent that cultural citizenship conditions these effects may not be independent of the electoral strength of the political parties of the left and their social and political entrenchment. The socialist party has been the largest party in Wallonia, and according to Coffé it "held to its traditional electorate through both distributing material benefits and by keeping traditional economic themes, or issues that it 'owns' high on the political agenda" (Coffé 2008, p. 179). More generally, all else is not equal across Flanders and Wallonia. Our study helps us understand how party strategy affects the number of immigrant-origin minority nominations across varying cultural citizenship contexts, however, political parties and party system configurations, including party system composition and competition, are inextricably linked to such contexts, are influenced by them and influence them in return.

Our analysis relies on a single election in a single country, the 2006 municipal elections in Belgium. To what extent can we generalize our findings across elections and countries? We rely on the 'electoral tradeoffs' theoretical framework that travels



well as long as case parameters are specified to extend this theory in productive ways. To illustrate, would we expect similar findings in post-2006 municipal elections in Belgium? The *cultural/historical* character of cultural citizenship suggests *continuity* therefore it may be reasonable to anticipate similar results at least for the socialist party. Now, the extension of voting rights to immigrant-origin minorities and their subsequent mobilization into the electoral process created a large pool of immigrant-origin minority voters; as a result the number of parties practicing "vote-inclusion" strategies may increase thus affecting relative constraints on nominations in varying cultural citizenship contexts. However other factors, including the electoral strength of the radical right in Flanders and how electoral appeals are formulated by political parties to attract the immigrant-origin minority vote, would condition expectations. Further, it is possible that constraints for the Green party may not change; the party's tradition of interest for minority issues and contact with minority communities coupled with potential future socio-economic changes among minorities may increase its minority support, but the Green parties' costs of inclusion may remain low due to its cosmopolitan constituency. These questions remain to be investigated in future studies.

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Compliance with ethical standards

Conflict of interest On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no conflict of interest

.Appendix I

See Tables 3 and 4.



Table 3 Parties of the left by region. Summary statistics and marginal effects

Variable	Mean	Std. dev	Min	Max	Predicted counts at (mean) & (1 SD above mean)	
					From	To
A. Socialist Party (sp.a), Flanders						
Nominated non-Western candidates	0.3625	1.031	0	7		
Radical right vote share	0.0713	0.0706	0	0.3295	1.25 (0.07)	0.62 (0.14)
Unemployment change	− 0.0027	0.0072	− 0.0401	0.0167		
Economic inequality	0.2893	0.031	0.2416	0.4226	0.60 (0.29)	0.12 (0.32)
Log(immigrant population)	4.1167	1.3832	0	10.2373	0.18 (4.1)	1.49 (5.5)
%Council seats	16.7967	14.5042	0	69.5652	0.43 (16.8)	0.28 (31.3)
District magnitude	24.7875	6.287	17	55		
Median income	21,892.01	1429.83	17,687.62	25,938.48	0.59 (21,892.01)	1.07 (23,321.84)
% with primary education	0.1193	0.0249	0.0621	0.1799		
N	160					
B. Socialist Party (PS), Wallonia						
Nominated non-Western candidates	0.4242	1.004	0	7		
Radical right vote share	0.0037	0.0127	0	0.0732	0.36 (0.0037)	0.43 (0.0165)
Unemployment change	0.0028	0.0071	− 0.0152	0.0264	0.39 (0.0028)	0.53 (0.0099)
Economic inequality	0.2961	0.0296	0.2552	0.4858		
Log(immigrant population)	4.0993	1.68	0	9.1956	0.21 (4.1)	0.52 (5.78)
%Council seats	38.3485	23.1529	0	85.7143		
District magnitude	22.8485	7.4162	11	51		
Median income	19,640.36	2290.171	15,214.47	27,245.57		
%with primary education	0.0985	0.01955	0.0358	0.1559		
N	132					
C. Groen!, Flanders						
Nominated non-Western candidates	0.3426	1.0779	0	7		

Table 3 (continued)

Variable	Mean	Std. dev	Min	Max	Predicted counts at (mean) & (1 SD above mean)	
					From	To
Radical right vote share	0.0907	0.0696	0	0.3295		
Unemployment change	− 0.0022	0.0056	− 0.0163	0.0156		
Economic inequality	0.2964	0.0341	0.2416	0.4226		
Log(immigrant population)	4.5625	1.3486	2.708	10.2373	0.14 (4.6)	2.16 (5.9)
%Council seats	5.2336	4.7735	0	28		
District magnitude	26.7778	6.5186	19	55		
Median income	22,154.4	1493.87	18,407.87	25,938.48		
%with primary education	0.1178	0.0247	0.0621	0.1763		
N	108					
D. Ecolo, Wallonia						
Nominated non-Western candidates	0.2027	0.4943	0	3		
Radical right Vote share	0.0036	0.0122	0	0.0732	0.17 (0.0036)	0.20 (0.0157)
Unemployment change	0.0028	0.0069	− 0.0152	0.0207		
Economic inequality	0.3043	0.0334	0.2594	0.4858		
Log(immigrant population)	4.0328	1.6296	0	9.1956	0.13 (4.03)	0.33 (5.66)
%Council seats	8.0741	5.4819	0	29.6296		
District magnitude	22.8649	6.9778	11	51		
Median income	20,034.66	2275.63	15,214.47	28,396.06		
%with primary education	0.0962	0.0194	0.0358	0.1454		
N	148					

Table 4 Parties of the right by region. Summary statistics and marginal effects

Variable	Mean	Std. dev	Min	Max	Predicted counts at (mean) & (1 SD above mean)	
					From	To
A. Christian Democrat and Flemish (CD&V), Flanders						
Nominated non-Western candidates	0.1479	0.5603	0	5		
Radical right vote share	0.0704	0.0669	0	0.3295		
Unemployment change	− 0.0023	0.0066	− 0.0401	0.0167		
Economic inequality	0.291	0.0282	0.2416	0.4226	0.18 (0.29)	0.07 (0.32)
Log(immigrant population)	4.0974	1.3798	0	10.2373	0.04 (4.1)	0.49 (5.5)
%Council seats	36.8232	18.1861	0	78.9474		
District magnitude	24.5876	6.0287	11	55		
Median income	21,897.56	1489.188	17,667.1	26,475.35		
%with primary education	0.1194	0.0252	0.0621	0.1769		
N	257					
B. Democratic Humanist Centre (CDH), Wallonia						
Nominated non-Western candidates	0.4235	0.822	0	4		
Radical right vote share	0.005	0.015	0	0.0732		
Unemployment change	0.0045	0.0072	− 0.0152	0.0264		
Economic inequality	0.3016	0.034	0.2552	0.4858	0.35 (0.30)	0.16 (0.34)
Log(immigrant population)	4.5134	1.5986	0.6931	9.1956	0.20 (4.5)	0.84 (6.1)
%Council seats	11.9758	16.0047	0	57.8947		
District magnitude	24.7882	7.5971	13	51		
Median income	19,471.54	2235.49	15,214.47	24,688.96		
%with primary education	0.0971	0.0199	0.0358	0.1498		
N	85					
C. Flemish liberals and democrats (VLD), Flanders						
Nominated non-Western candidates	0.1357	0.5287	0	4		

Table 4 (continued)

Variable	Mean	Std. dev	Min	Max	Predicted counts at (mean) & (1 SD above mean)	
					From	To
Radical right vote share	0.0791	0.0689	0	0.3295		
Unemployment change	− 0.0028	0.0065	− 0.0401	0.01565		
Economic inequality	0.2924	0.0304	0.2416	0.4226		
Log(immigrant population)	4.2643	1.4601	0	10.2373	0.04 (4.26)	0.45 (5.72)
%Council seats	24.9891	15.5484	0	66.6667	0.10 (24.989)	0.06 (40.54)
District magnitude	25.3618	6.4094	11	55		
Median income	21,955.27	1466.01	17,687.62	26,475.35	0.08 (21,955.27)	0.04 (23,421.28)
%with primary education	0.1180	0.0251	0.0604	0.1799		
N	199					
D. Reformist movement (MR), Wallonia						
Nominated non-Western candidates	0.4063	0.8532	0	5		
Radical right vote share	0.005	0.0147	0	0.0732		
Unemployment change	0.0033	0.0073	− 0.0152	0.0264		
Economic inequality	0.2974	0.034	0.2552	0.4858		
Log(immigrant population)	4.3404	1.7631	0	9.1956	0.16 (4.34)	1.53 (6.1)
%Council seats	18.6507	17.323	0	75.8621		
District magnitude	24.1458	7.9511	11	51		
Median income	19,403.04	2150.90	15,214.47	24,688.96		
%with primary education	0.0964	0.01995	0.0358	0.1454		
N	96					

Appendix II

See Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8.

Table 5 Models with interaction terms. Estimates of political, economic, and institutional effects on the nomination of non-Western candidates on party lists of parties of the left in Belgium. 2006 local elections

	Non-Western immigrant nominations	
	Socialist parties (sp.a & PS)	Green parties (Groen! & Ecolo)
Region (Flanders 1; Wallonia 0)	− 2.919	1.98
	(6.007)	(8.445)
Radical right vote share	13.922**	13.847
	(5.855)	(8.925)
Radical right vote share × region	− 23.931***	− 15.87*
	(6.711)	(9.587)
Unemployment change	43.458*	15.064
	(23.062)	(34.435)
Unemployment change × region	− 80.519**	31.167
	(33.490)	(45.159)
Economic inequality	− 2.726	− 1.729
	(9.006)	(11.107)
Economic inequality × region	− 48.86***	− 37.286
	(15.115)	(26.194)
Log (immigrant population)	0.5015**	0.776**
	(0.228)	(0.275)
Log (immigrant population) × region	1.074***	0.7303*
	(0.2492)	(0.3822)
%Council seats 2000	− 0.0014	0.011
	(0.0064)	(0.0264)
%Council seats 2000 × region	− 0.0298**	− 0.0064
	(0.0128)	(0.055)
District magnitude	− 0.0119	− 0.0493*
	(0.0223)	(0.0262)
Median income	− 0.0001	0.0001
	(0.0001)	(0.0002)
Median income × region	0.0005**	0.0004
	(0.0002)	(0.0003)
Percent w/primary education	− 16.963	18.816
	(11.294)	(14.974)
Percent w/primary education × region	16.462	− 28.125
	(13.322)	(19.764)
Constant	1.26	− 7.842
	(3.369)	(5.055)
Prob > chi^2	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R^2	0.4553	0.3996
N	292	256

Table 5 (continued)

Poisson Regression Results. Robust errors

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses; tests for overdispersion were negative; the model functional form approximates the distribution of the data

*$p \leq 0.10$, **$p \leq 0.05$, ***$p \leq 0.001$

Sources Immigrant populations, median income, economic inequality, and percent with primary education provided by National Institute of Statistics in Belgium (Direction Generale de la Statistique et de l'Information Economic). Unemployment accessed at ONEM unemployment service (Bureau Chomage, Office national de l'Emploi). Election data provided by the Service Elections (SPF Interieur). District magnitude was made available by Marc Hooghe



Table 6 Summary statistics and marginal effects, by region

Variable		Mean	Std. dev	Min	Max	Predicted Counts at (mean) & (1 SD above mean)	
						From	To
A. Socialist Parties, Flanders (sp.a) & Wallonia (PS) (municipalities where Socialist Parties fielded candidates)							
Nominated non-Western candidates	Flanders	0.3625	1.031	0	7		
	Wallonia	0.4242	1.004	0	7		
Radical right vote share	Flanders	0.0713	0.0706	0	0.3295	0.74 (0.071)	0.36 (0.142)
	Wallonia	0.0037	0.0127	0	0.0732	0.23 (0.0037)	0.28 (0.0164)
Unemployment change	Flanders	− 0.0027	0.0072	− 0.0401	0.0167	0.29 (− 0.0027)	0.22 (0.0045)
	Wallonia	0.0028	0.0071	− 0.0152	0.0264		
Economic inequality	Flanders	0.2893	0.031	0.2416	0.4226	0.48 (0.2893)	0.10 (0.3204)
	Wallonia	0.2961	0.0296	0.2552	0.4858		
Log(immigrant population)	Flanders	4.1167	1.3832	0	10.2373	0.12 (4.12)	1.09 (5.5)
	Wallonia	4.0993	1.68	0	9.1956	0.32 (4.1)	0.75 (5.78)
%Council seats	Flanders	16.7967	14.5042	0	69.5652	0.40 (16.8)	0.26 (31.3)
	Wallonia	38.3485	23.1529	0	85.7143		
District magnitude	Flanders	24.7875	6.287	17	55		
	Wallonia	22.8485	7.4162	11	51		
Median income	Flanders	21,892.01	1429.83	17,687.62	25,938.48	0.82 (21,892.01)	1.5 (23,321.8)
	Wallonia	19,640.36	2290.171	15,214.47	27,245.57		
%with primary education	Flanders	0.1193	0.0249	0.0621	0.1799		
	Wallonia	0.0985	0.01955	0.0358	0.1559		
N	Flanders	160					
	Wallonia	132					

Table 6 (continued)

Variable		Mean	Std. dev	Min	Max	Predicted Counts at (mean) & (1 SD above mean)	
						From	To
B. Green Parties, Flanders (Groen!) & Wallonia (Ecolo) (municipalities where Green Parties fielded candidates)							
Nominated non-Western candidates	Flanders	0.3426	1.0779	0	7		
	Wallonia	0.2027	0.4943	0	3		
Radical right vote share	Flanders	0.0907	0.0696	0	0.3295		
	Wallonia	0.0036	0.0122	0	0.0732		
Unemployment change	Flanders	− 0.0022	0.0056	− 0.0163	0.0156		
	Wallonia	0.0028	0.0069	0.0152	0.0207		
Economic inequality	Flanders	0.2964	0.0341	0.2416	0.4226		
	Wallonia	0.3043	0.0334	0.2594	0.4858		
Log(immigrant population)	Flanders	4.5625	1.3486	2.708	10.2373	0.10 (4.56)	0.75 (5.91)
	Wallonia	4.0328	1.6296	0	9.1956	0.50 (4.03)	1.78 (5.66)
%Council seats	Flanders	5.2336	4.7735	0	28		
	Wallonia	8.0741	5.4819	0	29.6296		
District magnitude	Flanders	26.7778	6.5186	19	55		
	Wallonia	22.8649	6.9778	11	51		
Median income	Flanders	22,154.4	1493.87	18,407.87	25,938.48		
	Wallonia	20,034.66	2275.63	15,214.47	28,396.06		
%with primary education	Flanders	0.1178	0.0247	0.0621	0.1763		
	Wallonia	0.0962	0.0194	0.0358	0.1454		
N	Flanders	108					
	Wallonia	148					

Table 7 Models with interaction terms. Estimates of political, economic, and institutional effects on the nomination of non-Western candidates on party lists of parties of the right in Belgium. 2006 local elections

	Non-Western immigrant nominations	
	Christian democratic parties (CD&V & CDH)	Liberal parties (VLD & MR)
Region (Flanders 1; Wallonia 0)	− 9.209	10.773**
	(7.435)	(5.002)
Radical right vote share	− 10.024	− 11.206
	(8.268)	(7.095)
Radical right vote share × Region	7.939	7.468
	(8.627)	(7.466)
Unemployment Change	− 1.811	− 21.637
	(39.612)	(30.846)
Unemployment change × region	− 17.055	16.87
	(47.310)	(39.002)
Economic inequality	− 22.997**	− 10.177
	(10.747)	(11.243)
Economic inequality × region	− 15.276	9.528
	(14.731)	(13.686)
Log (immigrant population)	1.061***	1.431***
	(0.253)	(0.321)
Log (immigrant population) × region	0.596**	− 0.2008
	(0.2753)	(0.2408)
%Council seats 2000	− 0.0015	0.0056
	(0.0146)	(0.0127)
%Council seats 2000 × region	− 0.008	− 0.042**
	(0.0202)	(0.0177)
District magnitude	− 0.0826**	− 0.0929**
	(0.0288)	(0.0329)
Median income	− 0.0001	0.00005
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Median income × Region	0.0004	− 0.0004*
	(0.0003)	(0.0002)
Percent w/ Primary Education	− 21.718	16.873
	(15.551)	(12.406)
Percent w/primary education × region	15.317	− 30.035*
	(17.802)	(16.182)
Constant	6.752	− 5.627
	(4.508)	(3.873)
Prob > chi^2	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R^2	0.5184	0.5047
N	342	295

Table 7 (continued)

Poisson regression results. Robust errors

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses; tests for overdispersion were negative; the model functional form approximates the distribution of the data

*$p \leq 0.10$, **$p \leq 0.05$, ***$p \leq 0.001$

Sources Immigrant populations, median income, economic inequality, and percent with primary education provided by National Institute of Statistics in Belgium (Direction Generale de la Statistique et de l'Information Economic). Unemployment accessed at ONEM unemployment service (Bureau Chomage, Office national de l'Emploi). Election data provided by the Service Elections (SPF Interieur). District magnitude was made available by Marc Hooghe



Table 8 Summary statistics and marginal effects, by region

Variable		Mean	Std. dev	Min	Max	Predicted Counts at (mean) & (1 SD above mean)	
						From	To
A. Christian Democratic Parties, Flanders (CD&V) & Wallonia (CDH) (municipalities where Christian Democratic Parties fielded candidates)							
Nominated non-Western candidates	Flanders	0.1479	0.5603	0	5		
	Wallonia	0.4235	0.822	0	4		
Radical right vote share	Flanders	0.0704	0.0669	0	0.3295		
	Wallonia	0.005	0.015	0	0.0732		
Unemployment change	Flanders	− 0.0023	0.0066	− 0.0401	0.0167		
	Wallonia	0.0045	0.0072	− 0.0152	0.0264		
Economic inequality	Flanders	0.291	0.0282	0.2416	0.4226	0.17 (0.2909)	0.06 (0.3192)
	Wallonia	0.3016	0.034	0.2552	0.4858	0.12 (0.3016)	0.06 (0.3357)
Log(immigrant population)	Flanders	4.0974	1.3798	0	10.2373	0.03 (4.1)	0.29 (5.5)
	Wallonia	4.5134	1.5986	0.6931	9.1956	0.11 (4.5)	0.59 (6.1)
%Council seats	Flanders	36.8232	18.1861	0	78.9474		
	Wallonia	11.9758	16.0047	0	57.8947		
District magnitude	Flanders	24.5876	6.0287	11	55		
	Wallonia	24.7882	7.5971	13	51		
Median income	Flanders	21,897.56	1489.188	17,667.1	26,475.35		
	Wallonia	19,471.54	2235.49	15,214.47	24,688.96		
%with primary education	Flanders	0.1194	0.0252	0.0621	0.1769		
	Wallonia	0.0971	0.0199	0.0358	0.1498		
N	Flanders	257					
	Wallonia	85					

Table 8 (continued)

Variable		Mean	Std. dev	Min	Max	Predicted Counts at (mean) & (1 SD above mean)	
						From	To
B. Liberal Parties, Flanders (VLD) & Wallonia (MR) (municipalities where Liberal Parties fielded candidates)							
Nominated non-Western candidates	Flanders	0.1357	0.5287 0	4			
	Wallonia	0.4063	0.8532 0	5			
Radical right vote share	Flanders	0.0791	0.0689	0	0.3295		
	Wallonia	0.005	0.0147	0	0.0732		
Unemployment change	Wallonia	− 0.0028	0.0065	− 0.0401	0.01565		
	Flanders	0.0033	0.0073	− 0.0152	0.0264		
Economic inequality	Flanders	0.2924	0.0304	0.2416	0.4226		
	Wallonia	0.2974	0.034	0.2552	0.4858		
Log(immigrant population)	Flanders	4.2643	1.4601	0	10.2373	0.10 (4.26)	0.62 (5.72)
	Wallonia	4.3404	1.7631	0	0.1956	0.19 (4.34)	2.35 (6.10)
%Council seats	Flanders	24.9891	15.5484	0	66.6667	0.38 (24.99)	0.21 (40.54)
	Wallonia	18.6507	17.323	0	75.8621	0.25 (18.65)	0.27 (35.97)
District magnitude	Flanders	25.3618	6.4094	11	55		
	Wallonia	24.1458	7.9511	11	51		
Median income	Flanders	21,955.27	1466.01	17,687.62	26,475.35	0.13 (21,955.27)	0.07 (23,421.28)
	Wallonia	19,403.04	2150.90	15,214.47	24,688.96		
%with primary education	Flanders	0.1180	0.0251	0.0604	0.1799		
	Wallonia	0.0964	0.01995	0.0358	0.1454		
N	Flanders	199					
	Wallonia	96					

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